HONDA The Power of Dreams

In its second era of F1 participation, Honda was highly successful as an engine supplier. The next challenge was to produce not only engines, but also the racing cars. It was only natural that engineers would develop this desire.

In 1998, Nobuhiko Kawamoto, then Honda president, declared that the company would participate as a factory team, and Honda Racing Development (HRD) was established in the UK to serve as its base.

In the winter of 1999, the RA099, with a Mugen Honda V10 mounted on a chassis manufactured by Dallara of Italy, was completed, and F1 driver Jos Verstappen*1 conducted a series of test runs, recording promising lap times. Expectations for Honda’s third era grew.

“There was, however, opposition to the project within the company, that making the racing cars would endanger Honda’s business,” recalled Shoichi Tanaka, who served as HRD’s first president from 2000. “There was a feud between the humanities and the sciences, between the sales department and the research department.”

As a result, in May 1999, just prior to the start of the season, Honda decided to abandon its “all-Honda” approach, and instead, decided to form a new partnership with a newly launched team, British American Racing (BAR), by jointly developing the car in addition to supplying the engine. In terms of pure competitiveness alone, Honda could have partnered with Jordan Grand Prix, an existing mid-sized team that was powered by Mugen Honda engines. The chassis engineers, however, could not give up their dream of developing F1 cars. One of the terms of the contract with BAR was that Honda could be involved in the joint development of the car chassis, which was the deciding factor in signing the partnership agreement.

“Our history of chassis design is about to begin,” said Akio Tomomura (chassis development). “I am looking forward to seeing the cars I worked on in the races,” commented Ikuo Kawasaki (aerodynamic development). Even though the dream of participation as a factory had vanished, expectations by the engineers ran higher than ever.

Meanwhile, Takeo Fukui, then senior executive in charge of the F1 project, said, “Honda will continue to be independent and self-reliant. To achieve this, we need strong product competitiveness and brand recognition. Our stance of ‘doing F1’ will have an effect on both of these,” explaining the significance of Honda’s third era.

Tanaka, HRD’s first president, was a true businessman who had been at the forefront of sales in various parts of the world. He had been stationed in Brazil, was a representative of local subsidiaries in France and Indonesia, and was expatriated to American Honda Motor (AH). Needless to say, he had nothing to do with Honda’s racing activities. At the age of 56, he was given the heavy responsibility of overseeing the third era of Honda F1 at the frontline, based in the UK.

“I still don’t know why they gave me the job,” Tanaka recalled. “I can only speculate, but the FIA had high expectations for Honda, so they were very angry when it decided not to race as a factory team at the last minute. We had to repair strained relationships with the other teams and make things work. I think maybe management chose me because they needed someone who could handle all the politics so that the engineers could focus on development.”

Despite having 1997 F1 champion Jacques Villeneuve behind the wheel, BAR, supplied with Honda factory engines from 2000, finished on the podium only twice in three years, and in the constructors' championship*2, finished in 5th, 6th, and 8th over the same period.

“We need to make an engine with higher potential, and not just the chassis,” said Takeo Kiuchi, who returned to the project in 2003 as project leader (PL). In Honda’s second F1 era, Kiuchi was in charge of developing the engine’s electronic control, and was the driver’s lead engineer. Once Honda withdrew from F1, he had returned to Honda R&D, where he was involved in the development of hybrid engines. Then, out of the blue, he received the order to return to F1.

He was witness to the dramatic changes to F1 engines during the decade he had been away.

“Honda’s F1 engine was not only far from the world’s best, but it was heavy and lacked power. Above all, it was completely devoid of new technology. We had to make the Honda R&D engineers admit this. We started from there.” (Kiuchi)

Since withdrawing from F1 at the end of 1992, racing engine constructor Mugen Corporation (later M-TEC) developed engines based on Honda technology which they supplied to Ligier and Jordan, who by 1999 had achieved four wins. There should not have been a technological vacuum. In reality, however, Honda’s F1 engines had fallen completely behind the rest of the world.

Kiuchi held numerous discussions with Honda R&D engineers and narrowed down specific numerical targets. However, even when it came to weight reduction, the engineers were initially adamant that there was no way they could make the engine any lighter.

“However, the engineers were very capable. Once the targets were set and they were satisfied, the rest went smoothly. In the end, we were able to create the lightest and most powerful engine.”

The same was true for chassis development. BAR’s engineers did not have the concept of setting target performance values and developing towards them. By thoroughly setting and developing towards lower center of gravity and weight targets, BAR’s competitiveness gradually improved. In 2004, BAR made a major breakthrough with 11 podium finishes and a 2nd place in the constructors’ championship, including a 3rd place podium finish by newcomer Takuma Sato.

The following year, however, BAR retreated to a disappointing 6th place in the championship. A two-race suspension due to a violation of vehicle weight regulations, caused by the fuel tank, did not help either. “The biggest cause of the slump, however, was the delay in aerodynamic development,” said Yasuhiro Wada, who became the HRD’s second president that year.

“Technical Director Jeff Willis had been calling for the construction of a state-of-the-art full-scale wind tunnel for years. However, Honda did not understand the importance of this and was extremely slow in making the decision to build it. I think it was finally completed in late 2005.”

For F1, the 1990s and beyond were the heyday of tobacco advertising. Honda’s partner, BAR, also had the full financial support of British American Tobacco (BAT), the world’s second largest tobacco company at the time.

Meanwhile since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) and the World Health Organization (WHO) had been gradually regulating tobacco advertising, which would be completely banned from F1 after 2006. Even before that, Tanaka, HRD’s first president , had been negotiating with BAT with a view to taking a stake in the team. His primary objective, he said, was to increase Honda’s influence in decision making.

“At that time, joint development of chassis was already underway. Of course, they had more experience in developing racing cars. Even so, there were areas where Honda’s strengths could be utilized. As expected, though, money talks and BAR was not keen on listening to what Honda had to say. We decided to create a framework that would allow our engineers to make their point even more clearly by having Honda take a stake in the company.” (Tanaka)

At the end of 2004, Honda acquired a 45% stake in the BAR Team and began joint management. The following fall, Honda acquired all of BAT’s shares in BAR. In 2006, Honda’s long awaited participation as a factory team, for the first time since its first era in the 1960s, had begun. 　

The team, officially renamed as Honda Racing F1 Team, had a rocky start to the season, but regained competitiveness into the latter stages. In August, Jenson Button won the Hungarian Grand Prix after starting from 14th grid, Honda’s first win as a factory team in 39 years since the Italian Grand Prix in 1967. The team’s perseverance in improving the engine, joint development of the chassis, and large-scale capital investment symbolized by the construction of a state-of-the-art wind tunnel, finally beginning to bear fruit. The team finished the season in fourth place in the championship. Honda also supplied engines and provided technical support such as gearbox development to the SUPER AGURI F1 TEAM founded by former F1 driver Aguri Suzuki.

However, the car developed for the 2007 season, lacked competitiveness from the pre-season tests. It had only scored points in three of the 17 rounds, and finished 8th overall. The reason for the poor performance was that, from a technical standpoint, the data obtained in the wind tunnel could not be easily reproduced in track tests. On the management side, the absence of a leader to oversee the Honda F1 team was a major factor.

The only way to get the team back on track was to bring in some of the biggest names. At the time, Pat Simmons had contributed to Benetton’s consecutive championship victories, Adrian Newey was considered an aerodynamic genius, and Ross Brawn had played a leading role in Ferrari’s golden era. While Simmons and Newey were pure engineers, Braun was a leader in team management. And Brawn was the only one who had left Ferrari and was on a freelance basis.

As early as March 2007, Wada had contacted Brawn, and continued to negotiate for half a year.

“We understand you want to spend more time with your family, but I want you to consider this your last challenge and help with Honda’s comeback,” Wada told Braun. In response, Braun said, “I want to experience moving towards a common goal again, giving it everything with the team. The more difficult it is, the more I’m motivated.”

In November that same year, Brawn took over as team president and formulated a three-year plan to start in 2008. ”In the first year, we will identify the team’s issues,” he said. “We will start early in the season to develop the car for 2009.”

Indeed, the team stopped improving the 2008 car as early as the mid-season and focused on developing the car for the following year. This was one of the reasons why Honda remained was ninth in the championship that year.

Brawn, however, had his sights set on the 2009 season, when the technical regulations were to undergo drastic changes. In order to improve overtaking opportunities on the track and make the races more interesting, the cars would have a number of aerodynamic restrictions. If development went right, Brawn saw this as a great opportunity to catch up with the top teams.

Even in its third year as a factory team, local engineers from BAR were still in control of chassis development, especially with aerodynamics. Honda engineers basically continued development at the Honda Automobile R&D Center, Tochigi (HGT), traveling to the UK for extended stays if necessary.

Atsushi Ogawa, Honda’s aerodynamic development leader, wanted to improve this situation. Even though he had made monthly trips to the UK and held meetings with the former-BAR engineers, Honda’s ideas were rarely adopted. Then one engineer made a breakthrough. It was Masayuki Minagawa, who was working on aerodynamic development at Honda R&D at the time.

“I was doing research on diffusers (which channels airflow to the rear of the car), and came up with a few ideas. Ogawa, who was in the U.K., said, ‘Send me your ideas, handwritten or anything. I want to show them Tochigi’s presence.’ One of the ideas was a double-decker diffuser that would dramatically increase the downforce *3 of the underside of the car.” (Minagawa)

Minagawa scanned the diagrams hand-drawn in his notebook, and sent them to Ogawa as an e-mail attachment. The local engineers were interested, saying, “There is a guy in Japan who has some interesting ideas.” Minagawa traveled to the UK in the summer of that year to explain his diagrams to his colleagues. From November, he was stationed in the U.K. to concentrate on development.

Only one month later, on December 5, then Honda president Takeo Fukui held an emergency press conference to announce the company’s complete withdrawal from F1. His explanation was that the global financial crisis triggered by subprime loans had a major impact on the company’s business, that F1 racing activities would put pressure on management, and that an efficient reallocation of management resources was necessary.

The team was transferred to Brawn, in order to avoid a sell-off of assets and mass layoffs of employees. The Brawn GP Formula One team also took over the cars that were being developed for 2009, and entered the 2009 season with the BGP001, powered by a Mercedes engine.

The team was strong from the first round, going on to dominate and win the drivers’ and constructors’ championships. The double-decker diffuser developed by Minagawa had contributed greatly to these results.

In the nine years since 2000, Honda won only once. It was unable to achieve its long-sought championship title. In retrospect, Honda’s third F1 era was chaotic, as seen by the withdrawal of the policy of factory team participation at the last minute, and the dizzying change of team representatives almost every two years.

Nevertheless, the team’s competitiveness had been steadily improving since Brawn took over. It was at this timing that Honda had suddenly announced its withdrawal. Brawn GP, which had dominated the 2009 season, was sold in its entirety to Mercedes-Benz, including the factory, after the season ended. The British chassis development staff from the Honda era took the lead, and Mercedes went on to win eight consecutive championships from 2014 to 2021.

“My biggest regret is that we didn’t continue until we reached the top. We had invested so much upfront, and we were strong enough to win the title.” It was also a disappointing end for HRD’s first president, Tanaka, who had jumped into the unknown world of F1 from the field of business, and laid the foundation for Honda’s third F1 era.